A couple of months ago, a certain grad student/atrocity humor blogger
who shall remain nameless emailed with the following question: "Could
you point me towards anyone who's done research on the linkage / lack
thereof between the mineral trade and sexual violence?" It seems that
in her graduate school endeavors, solid research requires actual
evidence to support the "cell phones/minerals cause rape" thesis that's become quite popular due to efforts of various activist groups, most notably the Enough Project.
It just so happened that this particular email arrived just a few days after I gave a talk on the subject of minerals and violence in the Congo, so I had already been searching for such evidence.
Long story short: there isn't any. As far as I can tell, there has as yet been no published report that systematically demonstrates a rigorous causal relationship between the mineral trade and the epidemic of sexual violence in the eastern Congo.
But, wait, you might say. There are lots of reports claiming that the mineral trade causes sexual and other forms of violence.
This is true. I certainly do not want to argue that there's no connection whatsoever. Much of the gender-based violence in the Congo is perpetrated by armed groups that are involved in the mineral trade. We know that just about every armed group in the eastern Congo has engaged in violence, looting, and rape at one time or another, and that many (but not all) of those armed groups also benefit from the trade in minerals. There's a definite correlation between some of the violence and the fact that armed groups profit from the mineral trade. And we know beyond any doubt that armed groups terrorize populations who live near their respective mines.
But the question we need to be asking is whether the majority of gender-based and other forms of violence in the eastern DRC are actually caused by the mineral trade. As long-time readers of this blog know, I am not yet convinced that the mineral trade causes the bulk of violence in the eastern Congo, or that getting the mineral supply chains under control would end the war against Congolese women and girls.
Why don't I believe this? Because there's no data showing that the mineral trade is the primary cause of violence in the eastern Congo. It's just not there. There are anecdotal accounts and reports on the mineral supply chains and reports on the horrific conditions in the mines. There are somewhat bizarre journalistic accounts like last week's 60 Minutes piece, which misled viewers into thinking that a gold pit in the largely peaceful Ituri district is at the epicenter of the current fighting. I sometimes hear that there might be data out there, or that an activist group is about to come out with a report showing a clear causal relationship, but as of yet, as far as I've been able to tell, there's nothing that shows anything that:
It just so happened that this particular email arrived just a few days after I gave a talk on the subject of minerals and violence in the Congo, so I had already been searching for such evidence.
Long story short: there isn't any. As far as I can tell, there has as yet been no published report that systematically demonstrates a rigorous causal relationship between the mineral trade and the epidemic of sexual violence in the eastern Congo.
But, wait, you might say. There are lots of reports claiming that the mineral trade causes sexual and other forms of violence.
This is true. I certainly do not want to argue that there's no connection whatsoever. Much of the gender-based violence in the Congo is perpetrated by armed groups that are involved in the mineral trade. We know that just about every armed group in the eastern Congo has engaged in violence, looting, and rape at one time or another, and that many (but not all) of those armed groups also benefit from the trade in minerals. There's a definite correlation between some of the violence and the fact that armed groups profit from the mineral trade. And we know beyond any doubt that armed groups terrorize populations who live near their respective mines.
But the question we need to be asking is whether the majority of gender-based and other forms of violence in the eastern DRC are actually caused by the mineral trade. As long-time readers of this blog know, I am not yet convinced that the mineral trade causes the bulk of violence in the eastern Congo, or that getting the mineral supply chains under control would end the war against Congolese women and girls.
Why don't I believe this? Because there's no data showing that the mineral trade is the primary cause of violence in the eastern Congo. It's just not there. There are anecdotal accounts and reports on the mineral supply chains and reports on the horrific conditions in the mines. There are somewhat bizarre journalistic accounts like last week's 60 Minutes piece, which misled viewers into thinking that a gold pit in the largely peaceful Ituri district is at the epicenter of the current fighting. I sometimes hear that there might be data out there, or that an activist group is about to come out with a report showing a clear causal relationship, but as of yet, as far as I've been able to tell, there's nothing that shows anything that:
- that violence happens more frequently or with greater intensity near the mines than it does in non-mining areas of the region,
- that violence happens more frequently or with greater intensity along the primary mineral supply routes,
- that armed groups engaged in the mineral trade proportionally commit more acts of violence than those not engaged in the mineral trade,
- or that those groups that control more mines or make more money from mining engage in proportionally higher levels of violence than those who control fewer mines and make less money.
This is the kind of
data we would expect to find if there were a direct causal relationship
between the two phenomena. If you know of any systematic arguments
that show otherwise, I would love to take a look.
The sad fact is that violence happens everywhere in the Kivu provinces. Armed groups that benefit from the mineral trade buy weapons and rape women. But so do armed groups that don't benefit from the mineral trade. And a significant number of rapes are committed by civilians who see that they will have total impunity for their crimes and take advantage of the situation.
Earlier this week, @alanna_shaikh linked to this map. The creator meshed data from Ushahidi's crisis reporting system onto a map of "coltan mining areas" to make the point that there is a "conspicuous correlation" between the two variables.
While
I certainly appreciate the creator's intentions to draw attention to
the Congo conflict, this map is horribly misleading. First of all,
there aren't coltan mines throughout North Kivu. A more useful mashup
would overlap the violence incidents with the actual locations of
specific mines. This matters because when you look ,
it's clear that, while violence is high in mining areas, it's also high
elsewhere. (There aren't any coltan mines, for example, between Goma
and Sake. What's there? IDP camps and a road.) The eastern Congo is
an incredibly violent place. Then of course, there's the problem that
Ushahidi's data, while a wonderful resource, is far from complete due to
the difficulties of reporting and collecting this sort of data. Sexual
violence cases are still underreported in the DRC due to victims'
concerns about shame and being shunned by their families and
communities. We also know that there are mines - even in the Kivus -
that are not militarized, despite the fact that there is gender-based
violence in those areas as well.More importantly, however, this
map doesn't show us what else is in these regions. For one thing, there
are large tracts of extremely fertile, hotly contested land whose
status has been disputed by members of competing ethnic groups for
decades. The Masisi region's volcanic soil is capable of producing up
to three harvests per year, and North Kivu's varied climate is ideal for
cattle ranching and dairy farming. There is money to be made in rural
North Kivu. People were killing each other over the rights to this land
before the wars and before mining was even a concern. Mobutu used
North Kivu's land as an instrument of patronage; everyone from the
Catholic Church to prominent politicians of whichever ethnic group was
in his good graces at the time got a piece of land in exchange for
loyalty to the regime. Under the RDC-Goma rebel government, land in
Masisi and elsewhere was given to prominent Tutsis as a reward for
supporting the regime and a means of securing Tutsi control of the
region. When the Tutsis lost power, many also lost their land. In
other words, it's much more complicated than just the mineral trade.
Which is why the argument that shutting down the mines will end all of
this violence is fundamentally flawed. It is, quite frankly, based on
incorrect assumptions and a lack of rigorously-analyzed evidence.An
all-encompassing focus on the mineral trade won't end violence in the
eastern DRC. Assuming that it were even possible to track the Congo's
minerals from source to market and that it would be possible shut down
the militarized mineral trade (and, given the limits of technology and
oversight, those are two mighty big assumptions), would the loss of
income force these armed
groups to the negotiating table? These forces are already
well-accustomed to terrorizing local populations to obtain the
necessities of life. Would their behavior really change if they lost
this income stream? I'm not sure. And, we must remember, there's the
tiny problem of (especially the FDLR) that the international community has until very recently completely ignored.Then
there's the lingering detail of the 1 million+ people who depend on the
mineral trade for their livelihoods. Any program to shut down the
mines have to take their employment into account. As Harrison Mitchell
and Nicholas Garrett I
do not know a single scholar of the Congo who buys into the "cell
phones cause rape" thesis. We all understand that the situation there
is far too complex to be reduced by the activists to a simple resource
war that could be solved if we just pressure Congress to stop the
conflict mineral trade (How many of you are willing to give up your
mobile phones to stand in solidarity with Congolese women? Keep in mind
that there aren't any conflict-free cell phones.).This doesn't
mean that minerals don't matter. But the militarized mineral trade is a
symptom of the disease of state failure, not the root cause of
violence. Even setting aside all of the logistical issues with
certification, controlling supply chains, taking physical control of the
mines, developing the technology necessary to track minerals, finding
livelihoods for newly unemployed miners, and creating a degree of
consumer consciousness that's stronger than the desire for an iPhone,
the violence won't end. It won't. There's no entity capable of
stopping it.Treating one symptom rarely cures a disease. We all
want the people of the Congo to live productive, peaceful lives that are
free from the constant threat of violence. We all agree that the
eastern DRC is in many ways the linchpin for regional stability. But
until there is serious security-sector reform, the Congolese government
can actually control its territory, tax, and pay its soldiers, and the
regional dynamics that drive much of the conflict over land, citizenship
rights, and Rwanda's role in the region are settled, armed groups and
civilians will continue to commit horrific acts of violence, simply
because they can. "Doing something" about the mineral trade won't
change that fact.Policymakers would do well to focus less on
oversimplified solutions to extraordinarily complex problems, and to
instead turn their attention to giving the people of the DRC what they
deserve and need: peace, public order, and a chance to make life
better. That will require a long-term, sustained effort that doesn't or a year. It will require .
It will require honest assessments of regional actors' territorial and
sphere-of-influence ambitions. It will require the recognition of
corruption in all its many varied forms, and of the need to directly
target aid to its beneficiaries.Above all else, it will require policies that are based on facts, not assumptions. The stakes are too high to pursue policies that are data-driven and have a reasonable chance of success.Then again, maybe it's easier to oversimplify things.
The sad fact is that violence happens everywhere in the Kivu provinces. Armed groups that benefit from the mineral trade buy weapons and rape women. But so do armed groups that don't benefit from the mineral trade. And a significant number of rapes are committed by civilians who see that they will have total impunity for their crimes and take advantage of the situation.
Earlier this week, @alanna_shaikh linked to this map. The creator meshed data from Ushahidi's crisis reporting system onto a map of "coltan mining areas" to make the point that there is a "conspicuous correlation" between the two variables.
While
I certainly appreciate the creator's intentions to draw attention to
the Congo conflict, this map is horribly misleading. First of all,
there aren't coltan mines throughout North Kivu. A more useful mashup
would overlap the violence incidents with the actual locations of
specific mines. This matters because when you look ,
it's clear that, while violence is high in mining areas, it's also high
elsewhere. (There aren't any coltan mines, for example, between Goma
and Sake. What's there? IDP camps and a road.) The eastern Congo is
an incredibly violent place. Then of course, there's the problem that
Ushahidi's data, while a wonderful resource, is far from complete due to
the difficulties of reporting and collecting this sort of data. Sexual
violence cases are still underreported in the DRC due to victims'
concerns about shame and being shunned by their families and
communities. We also know that there are mines - even in the Kivus -
that are not militarized, despite the fact that there is gender-based
violence in those areas as well.More importantly, however, this
map doesn't show us what else is in these regions. For one thing, there
are large tracts of extremely fertile, hotly contested land whose
status has been disputed by members of competing ethnic groups for
decades. The Masisi region's volcanic soil is capable of producing up
to three harvests per year, and North Kivu's varied climate is ideal for
cattle ranching and dairy farming. There is money to be made in rural
North Kivu. People were killing each other over the rights to this land
before the wars and before mining was even a concern. Mobutu used
North Kivu's land as an instrument of patronage; everyone from the
Catholic Church to prominent politicians of whichever ethnic group was
in his good graces at the time got a piece of land in exchange for
loyalty to the regime. Under the RDC-Goma rebel government, land in
Masisi and elsewhere was given to prominent Tutsis as a reward for
supporting the regime and a means of securing Tutsi control of the
region. When the Tutsis lost power, many also lost their land. In
other words, it's much more complicated than just the mineral trade.
Which is why the argument that shutting down the mines will end all of
this violence is fundamentally flawed. It is, quite frankly, based on
incorrect assumptions and a lack of rigorously-analyzed evidence.An
all-encompassing focus on the mineral trade won't end violence in the
eastern DRC. Assuming that it were even possible to track the Congo's
minerals from source to market and that it would be possible shut down
the militarized mineral trade (and, given the limits of technology and
oversight, those are two mighty big assumptions), would the loss of
income force these armed
groups to the negotiating table? These forces are already
well-accustomed to terrorizing local populations to obtain the
necessities of life. Would their behavior really change if they lost
this income stream? I'm not sure. And, we must remember, there's the
tiny problem of (especially the FDLR) that the international community has until very recently completely ignored.Then
there's the lingering detail of the 1 million+ people who depend on the
mineral trade for their livelihoods. Any program to shut down the
mines have to take their employment into account. As Harrison Mitchell
and Nicholas Garrett I
do not know a single scholar of the Congo who buys into the "cell
phones cause rape" thesis. We all understand that the situation there
is far too complex to be reduced by the activists to a simple resource
war that could be solved if we just pressure Congress to stop the
conflict mineral trade (How many of you are willing to give up your
mobile phones to stand in solidarity with Congolese women? Keep in mind
that there aren't any conflict-free cell phones.).This doesn't
mean that minerals don't matter. But the militarized mineral trade is a
symptom of the disease of state failure, not the root cause of
violence. Even setting aside all of the logistical issues with
certification, controlling supply chains, taking physical control of the
mines, developing the technology necessary to track minerals, finding
livelihoods for newly unemployed miners, and creating a degree of
consumer consciousness that's stronger than the desire for an iPhone,
the violence won't end. It won't. There's no entity capable of
stopping it.Treating one symptom rarely cures a disease. We all
want the people of the Congo to live productive, peaceful lives that are
free from the constant threat of violence. We all agree that the
eastern DRC is in many ways the linchpin for regional stability. But
until there is serious security-sector reform, the Congolese government
can actually control its territory, tax, and pay its soldiers, and the
regional dynamics that drive much of the conflict over land, citizenship
rights, and Rwanda's role in the region are settled, armed groups and
civilians will continue to commit horrific acts of violence, simply
because they can. "Doing something" about the mineral trade won't
change that fact.Policymakers would do well to focus less on
oversimplified solutions to extraordinarily complex problems, and to
instead turn their attention to giving the people of the DRC what they
deserve and need: peace, public order, and a chance to make life
better. That will require a long-term, sustained effort that doesn't or a year. It will require .
It will require honest assessments of regional actors' territorial and
sphere-of-influence ambitions. It will require the recognition of
corruption in all its many varied forms, and of the need to directly
target aid to its beneficiaries.Above all else, it will require policies that are based on facts, not assumptions. The stakes are too high to pursue policies that are data-driven and have a reasonable chance of success.Then again, maybe it's easier to oversimplify things.at the Ushahidi map itself
Conflicts over land having nothing to do with minerals erupt all the time.
really external financing of these armed groups
continue to point out, legitimizing the mineral trade is a far better idea than shutting it down.
pretend the peacekeepers only need to stay another six monthsnegotiating with unsavory non-state actors
not